what one sees instead is the cognitive blurring of sharp definitional boundaries between the "national" and "European" frames, and a shared sense of responsibility to deliver both at home and collectively. As this article will show, the pattern of socialization found in COREPER does not lead to the creation of a new overarching supranational identity, but rather to a more complex configuration of identity than is typically acknowledged.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides a concise summary of the theoretical argument. The second section details the pathway of socialization found in COREPER, with an emphasis on the scope conditions and mechanisms at work. The necessary scope conditions are high issue density/intensity and insulation from domestic politics, both of which imply that the socialization process in COREPER is forged by the "quality" of the link. The mechanisms explaining how socialization occurs in this institutional environment include strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. Following this, the third section discusses methods and the strategy of empirical triangulation. Section four contains the empirical story, which traces the negotiations of a controversial EU citizenship directive that was quietly resolved by COREPER and sent to the ministers for formal adoption. Specifically, the case covers the 1994 local elections directive granting all EU citizens the right to vote and run for office in the local elections of their current residence (that is, granting nonnational EU citizens local voting and participation rights). Finally, a brief concluding section summarizes how the identity configuration of permreps muddies conventional distinctions between "national" and "supranational" agency.
Overview of the Theoretical Argument
For rationalists, identities and interests are taken as preset and given, and the empirical focus is on the role of formal decision rules, relative power, and instrumental rationality in explaining bargaining outcomes.15 State agents are motivated more by a "logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences" 16 than by notions of responsibility, obligation, or informal, "soft law" rules and norms. In the rationalists' strategic conception of rules, actors employ language and communication as rhetorical devices to pursue instrumental interests, manipulate incentive structures via social influence, and so on.17 Normative compliance is the result of crafted, calculative reasoning and expected future benefits. While institutional environments have constraining and enabling effects on behavior by altering incentives, the impact of institutions on basic actor properties (attitudes, identities) is considered epiphenomenal.
Constructivism relaxes the assumption of preset, given interests and identities, allowing for the possibility that institutional environments may have transforma-tive effects on basic actor properties. Relative power brokering and instrumental rationality are accorded less primacy than in rationalism, and supplemented with attention to the deliberative aspects of negotiation, such as the role of discourse, persuasion, and the collective legitimation of arguments. According to the constructivist approach, EU institutions are hypothesized to have "thick" socializing effects on actors, which go beyond instrumental adaptation and strategic calculation to include the internalization of norms and rules into self-conceptions. In other words, the densities of institutional and normative environments are considered causal variables that, under the right background conditions, can have transformative effects on basic actor properties, including how individuals see themselves (conceptions of the self) and how they conceptualize their interests. In the case of successful socialization, then, the constructivist expects to see interests that "have been conditioned by a community standard that delimits the acceptable." 18 As the case evidence will show, one can further distinguish the internalized norms argument into Type I cases, where agents follow "socially expected behavior in a given setting or community," and Type II cases of accepting community norms as "the right thing to do." 19 The socialization story documented here does not disprove or contradict a rationalist reading,20 but at the same time there is abundant support for a "soft" constructivist account that brings the collective culture and normative environment of Brussels-based decision making into the picture. Essentially, what one sees in the institutional environment of COREPER among the EU permreps is an expanded conception of the self that includes noninstrumental, pro-norm behavior without the threat of external sanctioning; it is based on the internalization of standards of appropriateness. This can be consistent with rationalism, but it is necessary to expand the baseline of "self-interest" beyond utility maximization to include a wider range of egoistic and other-regarding perspectives. As such, this study joins a growing number of researchers who see value in developing more nuanced models of rationality beyond the instrumental understanding embedded in nearly all forms of rational choice.21 Alternative Explanations: Internalized Norms or Diplomacy 101?
The alternative explanation for everyday EU decision making is standard negotiation theory and two-level games analysis.22 The falsification test for the social- 942 International Organization ization story presented here is essentially: how does this differ from "diplomacy 101"? Using standard negotiation analysis, one would not be surprised to find, among the EU permreps, regularized practices of mutual understanding, moderating demands, and generalized reciprocity, especially given the scope conditions discussed in the next section. But according to this model, the motivations and incentive structures of the permreps would be firmly rooted in the consequentialist logic of an instrumental conception of the self and attendant interests. Against this default argument, I ask whether the empirical record shows an institutional context in which not just a logic of consequences is in play, but a distinct logic of appropriateness as well. Can one find evidence of an expanded conception of the self among national officials, and how would this differ from "normal" unsocialized bargaining in mixed-motive games?
To illustrate such differences, one can hypothesize four measures that would support the appropriateness logic and cut against the grain of conventional bargaining and two-level games analysis wedded to a logic of consequences. COREPER norms are informal and self-enforcing29 because adherence to them is considered the "right thing to do," as part of the permreps' principled commitment to collective decision making.30 The reflex to make decisions by consensus is a classic example of this and a durable practice viewed by the EU permreps as the "right thing to do" regardless of the formal decision-rule. One ambassador claimed that the "consensus-seeking assumption ... penetrates, in my mind, everything we do." 31 The mode of social control in COREPER is compatible with Hurd's legitimacy model, in which it is "noncompliance that requires of the individual special consideration and psychic costs," and in which "the internalization of external standards can ... defuse Olsonian problems of collective action by causing actors to interpret the mutually cooperative option as also being the individually rational one."32 Or as Wendt puts it, "external constraints become internal constraints, so that social control is achieved primarily through self-control." 33 Evidence of self-enforced informal norms without the threat of external sanctions and constraints would support the noninstrumental appropriateness logic.
Empathy and other-regarding behavior not linked to calculative reasoning.
The alternative explanation would expect to find empathic behavior linked 25. Hurd 1999, 387. 26. For example, one would expect to see wide recourse to formal rules such as the 1994 Ioannina Compromise, which holds that under conditions of qualified majority voting when a clear blocking minority does not exist (but at least twenty-three to twenty-five votes oppose), the Council will still "do all within its power" to find a "satisfactory solution." Dinan argues that the Ioannina Compromise was a "face-saving device" for "anti-EU" back-benchers in the British parliament and has "had no practical impact on EU decisionmaking." Dinan 1998, 299. For a similar argument-that the impact of the infamous 1966 Luxembourg Compromise to protect "vital national interests" has been highly exaggerated and largely unimportant for bargaining outcomes-see Golub 1999. 27. See Checkel, this volume. 28. Although it should be added here that evidence of this measure may be compatible with either Type I or Type II internalization. Additional tests are needed to measure the degree of "taken-forgrantedness." A useful index to operationalize the distinction used here is the discussion in Hurd 1999 of "habitual" versus "holistic" internalization.
29. See the "Socialization Mechanisms" section below. 30. See also Gheciu, this volume, in which she codes successful socialization as cases where norms are accepted because they are considered normal and "the right thing to do" is to comply with them; norms are not accepted just because they are directly linked to instrumental rewards. to instrumental calculations, and in an issue-intensive, in-camera setting such as COREPER, this would be based on both longer time horizons (for example, "I may need help next week") and reputational concerns. But the internalized norms argument expects to see acts of empathy and other-regarding behavior based on a different kind of calculus. The difference from the consequentialist logic is that the internalized norms model expects such acts to be what Wendt calls "self-binding" or "unilateral initiatives with no expectation of specific reciprocity." 34 Evidence supporting the internalized norms argument would include examples of empathy not linked to an instrumentalist conception of interests but seen as "the right thing to do." More specifically, evidence for Type II-internalized norms-socialization would include those cases in which national representatives worked to convince superiors back in the capitals to accept another delegation's plea or argument while dropping their own, even when veto options existed. This practice would be coded as normative suasion because actors who are persuaded by another's argument then defend the position to their authorities, seeking to convince those authorities to accept the reasoning while at the same time dropping their own unconvincing claim. In other words, these actors are successfully persuaded to change positions, and this carries potential costs to implement (that is, they risk the ire of the capital). Especially relevant for the collective community standards argument are those cases in which the group actively "plots" solutions to overcome domestic reserves, sometimes faking group outrage or artificially simulating a delegation's isolation on a position.35
But the empathy indicator is also clearly a case in which it is misleading to frame the question as "rationalism versus constructivism," as both schools offer similar predictions. Indeed, Keohane discusses several different ways that states can interpret self-interests "empathetically," some of which are consistent with standard bargaining (this would include other-regarding behavior he terms "instrumentally interdependent" and "situationally interdependent") and some of which are more akin to the internalized norm conception (for example, what he calls "empathetic interdependence" Reinforcing the intensity of interactions, the EU permreps also accumulate a great deal of experience through long periods of participation.44 The average tenure is five years, slightly longer than the typical three-or four-year diplomatic rotation.45 But some permreps remain in Brussels for much longer, upwards of a decade or beyond. Another reinforcement mechanism is the COREPER luncheon, held by COREPER II before the monthly General Affairs Council (GAC) and sometimes on a more topical, ad hoc basis. Lunches are frequently used to tackle the thorniest of problems, since attendance is heavily restricted, no notes are taken, and not even translators are present.46 There are also informal COREPER trips, hosted by the presidency, that precede European Council summits.
In sum, the first scope condition is COREPER's unique structural position in everyday EU decision making, with a brand of intensity that is generated by the density and scope of agendas and widespread participation in nearly all aspects of the Council's work; this is reinforced by extensive periods of interaction and numerous informal venues for negotiation. This scope condition can also be restated in hypothesis form: that what is said will not be reported to the capitals or the media. This often includes group discussion on how an agreement will be packaged and sold to the authorities back home. "At our level, publicity does not exist," an ambassador explained, "Our body is absolutely black; we can do deals.""47 The norms of insulation are so developed that national experts from the capitals are not allowed to attend COREPER meetings at all (one official referred to them as "spies," another called them "the watchdogs" who "are not allowed in the room").48 The role of insulation in COREPER diplomacy supports Checkel's hypothesis49 that persuasion and socialization are more likely in "less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings."
A structural feature of COREPER that often goes unnoticed is that insulation affords member states the capacity to reshape domestic constraints. As an ambassador put it, "COREPER is the only forum in the EU where representatives don't have a domestic turf to defend." Because of this, he went on to add, "it is often politically necessary to present a position knowing it is unrealistic. My minister of finance needs certain arguments to be presented. He has certain pressures from his constituencies. We have to make it look like we fought for this even though we both know it will lead nowhere. I will present it, and if it receives no support, I will drop it." 50 Along with insulation comes a high degree of input ("voice") in the instruction process, including how arguments/interests are articulated and defended. The degree of voice that the permreps can obtain stems from COREPER's basic mission to find solutions and keep the work of the Council moving forward. Domestic insulation has enabled the permreps to develop de facto decisionmaking capabilities.52 The best empirical indicator of the weight of COREPER's decision-making role is the prolific "A-point" procedure. A-points are "agreed points" (that is, issues agreed to within COREPER) that are passed en bloc and without discussion by the ministers at the beginning of each Council session.53 Even for files marked as B-points (that is, issues sent to the ministers that require further discussion), the input of COREPER should not be ruled out. In many cases, detailed negotiations have already taken place in COREPER (see the case study below for an example). It is remarkable, in fact, that COREPER's burgeoning de facto decision-making power has escaped every post-Maastricht "democratic deficit" revision unscathed, entirely on the rather thin reed that only ministers have juridical decisional authority.
To summarize, the second scope condition for COREPER socialization is insulated-from both domestic constituencies and domestic line ministriesnegotiation, coupled with de facto (as opposed to juridical) decision-making authority. This can be restated as follows: These informal norms act as cognitive markers for newcomers to adapt to the group's accepted standards. As I will show below in the case of Austria's "opt-out" argument, the group can reject arguments with exaggerated ferocity to shame capitals and pressure a change in national demands. Group outrage is used to signal that certain behavior and justification for demands is simply not done or is not acceptable.
Five informal norms stand out. First, there is a norm of diffuse reciprocity, or the diffuse balancing of concessions over an extended shadow of the future.57 Diffuse reciprocity can take many forms, including' concessions and derogations, or "going out on a limb" to persuade the capital for changes or a compromise. Dropping reserves or abstaining (rather than voting "no") are also political gestures that can be filed away and later returned in kind.
Second, there is a norm of thick trust and the ability to speak frankly, which is reinforced by weekly meetings, trips, and lunches. Thick trust is especially important during endgame negotiations or restricted sessions when the "real knives come out on the table.""8 Third, there is a norm of mutual responsiveness that is best described as a shared purpose to understand each other's problems. Knowing and understanding each other's interests and arguments is a key to "receiving understanding from the group."59 Mutual responsiveness is a form of collective legitimation, wherein arguments or pleas for special consideration are collectively accepted or rejected by the group. The fourth norm is a consensus-reflex. This is what Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace refer to as "the instinctive recourse to behave consensually." 60 Although systematic empirical data is lacking because of the confidentiality of negotiations, participants claim that the overwhelming bulk of decisions are made consensually. Even under conditions of qualified majority voting (QMV), permreps often spend extra time to "bring everyone on board." Pushing for a vote is considered inappropriate in most cases, and the "consensus assumption" is a reflexive habit. 61 Finally, there is a culture of compromise premised on a basic willingness to accommodate divergent interests and reinforced by the other norms listed above. This culture is facilitated by the "dynamic density" of COREPER's work and the horizontal nature of agendas. The normative effects of this culture include a selfrestraint in the calculations and defense of interests, seen for example when delegations quietly drop reserves after failing to convince the others of their arguments.
Taken together, these informal norms are widely practiced and firmly institutionalized in COREPER's organizational culture.62 As the case study of local elections negotiations will show, adherence to these norms cannot be explained by either a pure incentive-based (consequentialist) or normative (appropriateness) logic, but instead represents a subtle blending of the two. That is, pro-norm behavior is rooted in a complex combination of both strategic calculation and role-playing socialization. Which came first, and how these normative scripts became institutionalized into COREPER routines, remains largely to be told.
Normative suasion. COREPER has its own locution, with signals, key phrases, and unspoken meaning. There is also a certain element of theatricality, in manufacturing intrigue; how else could one sit through yet another round of fishing quotas, as one permrep alluded. All of this is the typical grammar of diplomats, to be expected in issue-intensive, insulated settings where negotiators develop long-term interpersonal relationships. Going further though, one also sees a wide range of discursive resources that permreps can use in presenting and collectively legitimating arguments. This real possibility for normative suasion is what separates COREPER from the alternative argument of "normal" interstate negotiation. For example, as the local election case study will show, COREPER is considered the EU's locus classicus for "opt-out" negotiations, since permreps use collective legitimation to determine who warrants special consideration backed by standards of fairness where persuasive justifications carry the day (rather than relative power, voting weights, or the decision-rule). Evidence of this pattern would tend to support Checkel's hypothesis63 that socialization is more likely where agents do not "lecture or demand" but rather act on "principles of serious deliberative argument." Learning the derogation discourse is an important tool of the trade in COREPER, and senior permreps develop idiosyncratic methods for signaling when they need special dispensations. For many, this includes having a sense of humor when isolated or when national political sensitivities are being discussed. Normative suasion is an important socialization mechanism in COREPER, and unlike the mechanism of strategic calculation, it is sustained over time without respect to the structure of incentives or the existence of external sanctions. But argumentative resources are intertwined by consequentialist and appropriateness logics, and it is often difficult to tease the two motivations apart. persuasive power of one's arguments weighs on outcomes.64 Representatives claim that they come prepared to convince and be convinced by others, and many of the weekly meetings are geared toward reaching a "reasoned consensus" rather than a vote.65 Arguing and persuasion are also seen in how the permreps signal that something is particularly important or request mutual understanding from the group (irrespective of the formal decision-rule).
Participants claim that even in rare instances when they do vote, it is exceptional that this is done without the consent of the "no's.",66 In COREPER, the power of a good argument can be as compelling as a blocking minority or the shadow of the veto. The possibility of persuading others with a convincing argument and the norms of mutual responsiveness work as a great equalizer in COREPER negotiations. As a result, smaller member states who articulate sound arguments and/or clearly explain their positions can often punch above their weight. According to one participant, "If you convince others, it's with good arguments. Big or small makes no difference. In fact, the big member states often have higher burdens of proof in order to convince the others."'67
Another example of normative suasion is how permreps engage in the collective "plotting" of agreements.68 Plotting is a negotiation pattern in COREPER that demonstrates how a collective rationality can reformulate individual, instrumental rationality. The basic function of plotting is using the group to redefine a national position or to reshape domestic constraints.69 "To get new instructions we have to show [the capital] we have a black eye," an ambassador explained, "We can ask COREPER for help with this; it is one of our standard practices." 70 According to another, "Sometimes I will deal with impossible instructions by saying, 'Mr. Chairman, can I report back the fierce opposition to this by the fourteen others?' And sometimes fierceness is exaggerated for effect."71 Exaggerating the fierceness of opposition is thus a group strategy to collectively legitimate or reject arguments. A clear illustration of this practice is seen below in the way the group handles Austria's claim for special treatment.
In COREPER, this takes on an additional layer of collective legitimation as a framework of shared meaning within the standards of appropriateness. As Risse argues, in a "collective communicative process" actors are engaged in determining "whether norms of appropriate behavior can be justified, and which norms apply under given circumstances."72 This is a hallmark of COREPER's role in the EU system, and viewed from the process level of everyday decision making, the stamp of collectively negotiated standards of appropriateness is unmistakable. In the case of local elections (see below), this can be seen in how the permreps deliberate derogation requests against a principled commitment for maximal interpretation of "equal treatment" standards in EU voting rights.
Methods and Data
My research design follows a methodological strategy of "empirical triangulation" combining several qualitative and quantitative data sources: semi-structured interviews, archival documentation (Council documents such as the travaux preparatoires, press releases, agendas, and so on), and secondary sources. Another pattern is that newcomers initially tend to view their counterparts as rivals. "I saw my colleagues as opponents at first," one deputy commented.76 Another claimed, "Early in our membership we acted tough and we had these positions, 'Others don't like it, too bad.' But the politicians back home learned fast to be prepared to compromise. Now we are known as a country others can turn to for a compromise."77 On balance, the evidence suggests that newcomers have relatively high levels of ingrained cognitive priors, which supports Checkel's hypothesis78 that under such conditions there will be greater resistance to normative suasion. The COREPER novice who "treats colleagues as opponents" undergoes a period of social learning (and mimicry) during which they adopt new cognitive templates in order to operate in an unfamiliar environment. Some newcomers recall receiving extra patience and understanding from the group; a permrep from one of the newer EU member states commented, "They [COREPER] gave [us] and the new member states special patience, but now I think that's over."79
In summary, while no guarantee against potential measurement bias, the built-in controls of triangulation, newcomer sampling, and re-interviewing help to minimize such effects. More importantly, they strengthen the case for the independent causal influence of socialization dynamics within COREPER. To directly test the four socialization measures spelled out in section two, the argument now shifts to an examination of the 1994 local elections directive, a controversial and politically unpopular extension of voting and participatory rights for EU citizens. With this directive, for the first time, the EU allowed citizens from any member state to vote and run for office in municipal elections based on wherever they resided in the EU.80
Socialization in COREPER: The Case of the 1994 Local Elections Directive
The EU foreign affairs ministers, meeting in the GAC, adopted a directive on the right to vote and run for municipal elections on 19 December 1994.81 The 75. One common response was that following written instructions alone (that is, just reading from them) was a sure way to be left out of the discussion. substance of this directive had already been agreed upon twelve days earlier in COREPER. Negotiations were intentionally kept out of the GAC and the ambassadors were encouraged to reach an agreement in COREPER that could then be formally rubber-stamped by the ministers.
The local elections directive covered sensitive domestic political issues of electoral and citizenship laws, requiring the majority of member states to pass constitutional amendments to extend rights to "nonnational" EU citizens. The directive effectively established a principle of equal treatment between national and nonnational EU citizens. Moreover, the principle of equal treatment was agreed upon at a level of maximum coverage, with a minimalist interpretation of acceptable national "opt-outs." The principle of equal treatment agreed to in COREPER even went beyond earlier Commission proposals that considered minimum residency requirements a prerequisite for expanding local voting rights to Community nationals.82
During negotiations, several delegations (including Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden) initially voiced preferences for maintaining residency requirements that already existed in national law (see Table 1 ). However, the final terms of the directive allowed minimum residency rules in Luxembourg and, on an extremely limited basis, in Belgium. It was a shared understanding among the EU permreps that "opt-outs" would have to meet high standards for justification because of the potential for derogations to water down the scope and application of local voting rights. From the earliest discussions in COREPER, there was an informal and sometimes shifting majority of members who defended the need for equal treatment between national and nonnational EU citizens. Counterfactually, the argument presented here is that minus socialization, the final outcome would have been very different-if agreement would have been reached at all.
Explaining the Local Elections Negotiations: Testing the Alternative Explanation
This article contends that everyday EU decision making is not all about relative power, formal decision-rules, and instrumental interest calculations. If it were, the alternative argument is that bargaining behavior and everyday outcomes can be explained with standard negotiation theory and two-level games analysis. However, if the alternative explanation was correct, one would expect to see a very different sequence of bargaining behavior leading to a different kind of outcome than what occurred in this case. First, although at least four delegations (Denmark, France, Greece, and Austria) were interested in derogations and could have credibly linked such claims to the "shadow of the veto", none did. Moreover, after 82. The Commission's position was for minimum residence at least equal to the term of local office to vote, and double the term of office in order to stand for election. European Communities Bulletin 9-1986, 44. In effect, this would apply the Luxembourg derogation (see discussion below) to the entire EU. failing to convince the group on the merits of their special circumstances, each reconsidered or dropped their demands. In the counterfactual "diplomacy 101" scenario, COREPER sans socialization, this behavior would remain anomalous. Second, the alternative explanation would not hypothesize a maximalist interpretation of Article 8(b) establishing the principle of equal treatment between national and nonnational EU citizens in municipal elections. Given the sensitive domestic political issues concerning electoral and citizenship laws,83 as well as the unanimity decision-rule that applied here, one would expect a much wider acceptance of national derogation and exemption claims than resulted. In short, the "diplomacy 101" model would predict a tendency toward a least-common-denominator application of Article 8(b). But as I will show, explaining the bargaining behavior of the EU permreps as well as the (maximalist) outcome is not possible without reference to how standards of appropriateness and group-community norms to collectively legitimate arguments are an internalized part of COREPER's collective culture. 
Relevance of Scope Conditions
The local elections case provides solid evidence for how scope conditions play a role in promoting socialization. The intensity dimension is seen in the complex linkages between local elections and the larger political stakes of implementing the necessary secondary legislation of the Maastricht Treaty on time. Specifically, the treaty set a 31 December 1994 deadline to reach agreement on the detailed implementation rules for local voting rights. There was a general perception of responsibility among the permreps to reach agreement on a directive that would become a key substantive component of the fledgling EU citizenship chapter agreed to at Maastricht. This sense of responsibility comes out clearly in content analysis of interviews with participants, who claimed there was a shared belief that if it was sent to the ministers they would either not reach agreement at all or would be unable to "contain" discussions for derogations. A protracted stalemate on local elections, a heated debate among the foreign ministers, or a substantively watered-down directive in the scope and terms of application were all scenarios that the EU permreps collectively wanted to avert. Within this context, negotiations were both intense and sustained, supporting Hypothesis 1 (that internalized group-community standards are more likely under such conditions).
The local elections case also illustrates the importance of the second background condition: insulation. In this instance, many of the permreps were instructed by their capital to keep negotiations at their level and avoid the GAC. One official claimed his ambassador's instructions clearly signaled the need to "keep it away from the press, where it would have been politicized quickly."'84 Another explained, "We all knew that if the discussion was put a certain way we never would reach agreement. Because of the press, pressure from national populations, the idea that 'We will be run by foreigners.'"'85 This supports Stasavage's findings that insulated negotiations are a strategically rational institutional design where the risks of posturing run high.86 The high degree of insulation manufactured to help COREPER "find solutions" also clearly supports Hypothesis 2 (that internalized norms are more likely under such conditions). Indeed, insulation proved critical to the process of normative suasion, seen below in the use of "restricted" sessions to sort out whose pleas for special consideration warranted attention. The restricted ambassadors-only setting provided a degree of insulation for principled debate and deliberative argumentation that other Council bodies, especially the GAC, simply did not possess. 
International Organization Negotiating Derogations: Collective Legitimation and the Principle of Equal Treatment
The most critical stage of negotiations centered on who would receive derogations from the scope and application of the directive. The entire agreement hinged on this issue, because it would define how extensive coverage was and whether the principle of equal treatment would be interpreted in a maximal or minimal sense. When the ambassadors began derogation discussions in the fall of 1994, nearly half were under instruction to seek special consideration, although the presentation of these "special problems" would only be played out over the next seven weeks. In particular, six member states would claim serious domestic political difficulties: Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Greece, Austria, and Belgium. See Table 2 .
Luxembourg received the earliest support for a derogation, and discussion reiterated why this was justified, given the high proportion of nonnational Community residents-nearly 30 percent of the total electorate.87 There was also the precedent of the 1993 directive on the right to vote in European Parliament elections, where Luxembourg was allowed to set minimum residency requirements of five years for nonnational EU voters and ten years for candidates.88 The agreed wording of the derogation covers a member state where nonnational EU citizens form more than 20 percent of the total electorate, effectively limiting the exemption to Luxembourg (that is, the 20-percent threshold is not applicable to individual municipalities within member states). But the Luxembourg exception did create a precedent that other delegations would try to extend to their own "special" problems in justifying a case for national derogations.
Denmark, for example, already allowed all foreign nationals the right to vote in local elections after a minimum residency of three years. They therefore wanted to extend this residency requirement to nonnational EU citizens as a special clause to the directive. But few supported a fixed residency requirement, under the logic that Danish nationals were not subject to the same restriction and, it was argued, this would violate the principle of equal treatment between national and nonnational EU citizens.89
Group discussion led to a consensus that equal treatment should not be enforced by sliding scale, whereas justification in the case of Luxembourg could be extended by varying degrees to other domestic contexts.90 This argument carried considerable persuasive power, and there is no evidence that Denmark put up much of a struggle after failing to sell their case in COREPER. The Danish ambassador kept 
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Why the French would drop this reserve requires a two-part explanation, of which neither part fits the standard negotiation story. First, the French ambassador became convinced that a maximal interpretation of equal treatment was essential and the quota system was incompatible with this concept.95 Second and more tellingly, the French ambassador then went "out on a limb" to convince foreign ministry superiors (who were well aware of the bellwether position of the Senate on nonnational citizenship rights) that the quota argument was unconvincing and lacked justification.96 Going one step further, below I track how the change in French position and quiet removal of the quota proposal, coupled with acceptance of others' derogation claims, shows a clear instance of Type II normative suasion.
Greece and Austria both experienced difficulties generating understanding for their special problems. Both arguments were rejected in COREPER, and each shows a dynamic of collective legitimation that the alternative explanation would miss because of the irreducible quality of communicative rationality involved. Nor can standard negotiation theory explain why the rejectees made no recourse to the "shadow of the veto." One rejection came informally and was essentially unspoken, while the other required a more dramatic technique. Raised initially at the working-group level and during informal bilateral talks, the Greek delegation voiced what one group member described as "their hypothetical concern that they could have the future obligation to give Turkish citizens the right to vote" should Turkey ever become an EU member state.97 But Greece never came out and made an argument for a derogation at the group level in COREPER. The Greeks, perhaps aware that their argument lacked persuasive power, quietly dropped their reserve.
A similar hypothetical concern was raised by Austria, but this time the group relied on a more explicit rejection from the presidency, then held by Germany, to delegitimize and even "shame" Austria's claim for special understanding. "They were afraid of how the directive would be accepted internally," a group representative recalled, "They are afraid of extreme Right movements and they have a high standard of living, so it was not easy to explain to them the advantage of the directive."98 The Austrian ambassador pressed for a special derogation twice at the level of COREPER. The first time, no one said anything in reply. "We just sat there and listened," a participant recalled: Interviews at Austria's permanent representation confirm that the group rejection was presented back in Vienna as a consensus among the other member states for a maximal interpretation of the directive's application, but that the group gave assurances that a review procedure would enable future reevaluation.100 Austria's "black eye" in this case is consistent with the delegation's reputation early in their membership for delivering rigid instructions and inflexible policy positions in Brussels.
It is plausible that differences between the Greek and Austrian appeals to the group were partly a function of the latter's noviceness (Austria joined the EU in January 1995). One large member state's ambassador with senior status among the group summarized Austria's behavior in this case as simply, "they were too new." 101 The pattern evidenced here also lends support to Checkel's hypothesis that socialization is more likely when agents have fewer ingrained cognitive priors and beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency's message.102 While it is important to avoid overstating the difference in tact by Greece and Austria, the internalized norms argument would account for the difference in argumentation by contrasting two delegations at very different stages of membership and degrees of internalization.103
The noviceness argument is also relevant for relating the differential behavior of Greece and Austria to what this volume calls role-playing (Type I) socialization. As Checkel explains, role-playing socialization involves a process whereby an agent learns new roles, acquiring the knowledge to act upon them.1" In this instance, one can code Austrian bargaining behavior as too new to act the role, compared to Greece's more cautious and informal probing of group support for some form of limited exemption. A key question for Type I socialization is how does one know what is a socially expected role in a given community setting? Austria's bargaining approach shows how such a learning process among newcomers might work in COREPER, and it represents an important learning experience for them to acquire the knowledge to act on a new role.
Whatever the case, the interviews consistently confirm that the group rejection of Austria's demand was a key delimiter in derogation negotiations. Indeed, from this point on, a maximal interpretation of equal treatment prevailed. For those who still had outstanding derogation claims-including Denmark, France, and Belgium, as well as Greece's hypothetical and as-yet informal request-the Austrian Socialization and Decision Making in the European Union 963 rejection served as a marker for the standards by which derogation arguments would be measured.
The final "special" problem was raised by Belgium, which proved to be the endgame of derogation talks. Because of cleavages between the French, Dutch, and German language communities in Belgium, the directive had the potential to alter linguistic majorities within municipalities.1'5 Strategically, the Belgian delegation waited to present their case until the others' arguments had been heard. One ambassador recalled that the issue was "How to accept the Belgium problem without opening the Pandora's box of Treaty revision?" "We were able to do it in COREPER," he added, "but it would have been difficult to do in a crowded, mediacized General Affairs Council." 106 The Belgian ambassador requested a restricted session to clear the room and said, "We will need constitutional changes to transpose this directive and the Flemish Chamber will not accept it without a derogation." Unlike the other failed derogation arguments, the Belgian problem was justified with a persuasive argument, and one that genuinely convinced the others, even those who were initially skeptical. According to an ambassador from one of the large member states, "An example of persuasion and being convinced was the Belgian derogation on local elections. When I first read it, I thought, 'This is stupid.' But I became convinced they had a real problem there." 107 The Belgian derogation was settled the following week over lunch (on 7 December), again in the restricted, ambassadors-only format. The terms of the derogation are included as an annex to the directive. Specifically:
Belgium states that if it were to make use of the derogation provided for in Article 12(2) that derogation would be applied to only some of the local government units in which the number of voters within the scope of Article 3 exceeded 20% of all voters where the Belgian government regarded the specific situation as justifying an exceptional derogation of that kind.108
The 7 December lunch included a group discussion of how to explain the Belgian derogation to their capitals. As one participant explained, "we had a discussion of the type of arguments we could use back to our capitals to explain why this derogation was necessary." 109 The ambassadors from France and Denmark agreed to drop their requests for exemption. The Greek and Austrian delegates remained quiet. Portugal's ambassador also expressed confidence that Lisbon would agree to abstain, despite instructions to reject any derogation. Before restarting COREPER after lunch, the ambassadors each telephoned their foreign ministers to explain the agreement reached. style of brinkmanship by Denmark, France, Greece, and Austria as the Belgian issue lurked in the background and the 31 December deadline loomed. In short, one would have seen a different outcome. As the participants saw it, the Belgian problem lurked in the background even before the Belgian ambassador asked for a partial, flexible derogation; the issue was more how to justify the Belgian exception without opening the Pandora's box of special dispensations for any member with sensitive national concerns. Reaching a normative consensus on acceptable derogations was based on group-community standards of fairness, and included obligations of appropriate self-restraint for those delegations who lacked persuasive arguments (which helps account for the complete lack of veto threats, even among "exporter" states such as Portugal).
In the case of Austria's argument, the instrumental rationale ("Why can't the group explain the logical case to us") not only failed, but group norms were used to shame the Austrian position and delegitimize the argument as unacceptable. The Belgian ambassador, widely considered the doyen of COREPER during the late 1980s and 1990s, used his considerable argumentative resources to convince the others that the derogation would be of a closed nature, and used as sparingly as possible. The Belgian derogation unambiguously demonstrates the power of persuasion and role of argumentative rationality in everyday EU decision making: a small state with a "good" argument convinced the others, some of whom were initially skeptical, to accept their claim and in a few cases "go out on a limb" to sell the agreed results back home to the capital.
The local elections example thus offers empirical support for the internalized norms argument, and the case evidence displays both Type I and Type II characteristics. Type I internalization-rule-following behavior based on socially expected standardsll"-can be seen in the way those with unconvincing derogation claims dropped their demands. This includes Denmark, Greece, Austria, and France on quotas. Evidence of Type I internalization can also be seen in the nonaction of "exporter" states such as Portugal, who logically preferred no derogations at all, but displayed none of the instrumental calculative reasoning (including any hint of recourse to veto rights) that would be expected in the standard bargaining explanation. Portugal's abstention is more consistent with the logic of appropriateness and socially accepted standards to avoid blockage of the group's "reasoned consensus" around partial, limited exemption for Belgium, France (on mayoral candidates), and Luxembourg.
Type II internalization-accepting group-community standards as "the right thing to do" 112-is evidenced by the "reasoned consensus" legitimating Belgium's plea for special consideration. The strongest evidence of Type II normative suasion can be seen in the actions of the French ambassador. Carefully triangulated interview histories support a characterization that he was genuinely persuaded by his Bel-111. See Checkel, this volume. 112. Ibid. gian colleague's argument, after initial doubts, and then went on to convince his superiors in Paris to accept Belgium's partial exemption while at the same time dropping the French preference for a quota system. According to the key participants involved, this action was premised on becoming convinced that helping Belgium was the right thing to do. As one ambassador put it, "we found understanding in our capitals ... in the end we persuaded our governments, we did it very much for Belgium."
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In summary, the local elections case offers evidence that COREPER socialization affects not only strategies, but also conceptions of the self. Evidence of an expanded conception of the self, in which permreps practice internalized groupcommunity standards based on a noncalculative logic of appropriateness, can be seen in both the bargaining behavior and outcome of the local elections case. The interview and case-study data offer confirming evidence for the four socialization measures discussed in section two. First, I have shown noninstrumental selfrestraint among several delegations after they failed to convince the others of their argument (including Denmark, France, and Greece). Second, there were numerous examples of self-enforcing adherence to informal norms, such as the "self-control" of derogation claimants to not explicitly reference veto options or drop reserves based on favorable cost-benefit ratios. Third, evidence of empathy and otherregarding behavior not linked to calculative reasoning can be seen in the "reasoned consensus" to legitimate Belgium's derogation claim even though several ambassadors had to sell the validity of Belgium's case to their superiors while dropping their own claims. Fourth, and finally, this case illustrates the limits on instrumentalism through the collective legitimation of arguments. Restricted sessions were used to collectively accept and reject derogation claims (and "plot" ways to sell the Belgian derogation to ministers) around a shared understanding of maximal interpretation of equal treatment. As a result, the internalized norms argument can more fully account for the way in which Denmark, France, and Greece quietly dropped, or chose not to articulate, derogation claims than can "diplomacy 101." More dramatically, the group rejection of Austria's claim demonstrates how collective legitimation places limits on instrumental behavior by signaling that certain behavior is just not acceptable. In sum, the constructivist logic of internalized norms can better account for both the bargaining behavior and outcomes of the local elections case than the rationalist logic of consequences alone. pean levels of governance becoming amalgamated."14 Accordingly, COREPER's Janus-like design is an anomaly for theorists who draw rigid distinctions between "national" and "supranational" agency. For example, in one prominent account of European integration, the corporate body of "supranational entrepreneurs" in the EU is effectively limited to European Commissioners."5 But the EU permreps belie such a straightforward pigeonhole. As Wallace puts it, "It would be a caricature of this intricate policy process to counterpose national actors and supranational entrepreneurs as separate elites, promoting opposed interests." 116 The permreps who participate in weekly COREPER negotiations and share a collective responsibility to maintain the output of the Council as a whole, nicely illustrate how the logics of consequences and appropriateness can interface, which in turn suggests that national and supranational identifications can become complexly intertwined. According to March and Olsen, "Political actors ... calculate consequences and follow rules, and the relationship between the two is often subtle." 117 Perhaps surprisingly, permreps do not self-reflectively see these as competitive or contradictory role/identity sets. My findings are somewhat at odds with others in this volume, such as Beyers and Hooghe, who offer clear-cut evidence of ranked "primary" and "secondary" allegiances among EU officials."" A major difference, of course, is the point of reference: they are examining the administrative expert level of Council working groups and Commission officials, and both of these display qualitative differences from COREPER in scope conditions as well as what Egeberg refers to as "organizational characteristics." 119 The testimonies of the permreps interviewed for this project suggest that identities and role conceptions are not so clearly juxtaposed at this level of the EU system. Overall, the evidence points to a pattern of symbiosis between national and collective identities.120 The EU permreps have operationalized the concept of "double-hatting." 121 Finally, it is worth further consideration how the socialization effects identified in this article are potentially reversible. That is to say, the Brussels-based culture of decision making, endowed with dense informal norms and standards of appropriateness, could be undone. First, there is little, if any, evidence to support a "holistic" internalization thesis in which norm compliance becomes automatic.'27 Rather, COREPER socialization is a process of incremental, partial internalization. This point is evidenced more clearly in my larger multiple-case-study project, where the British, for example, display a more a la carte adherence to informal norms when there are principled objections to EU policies (as in social policy). 128 This study did find hard evidence of Type II internalization,129 particularly in the way those with rejected derogation claims convinced their capitals and/or "went out on a limb" to secure the Belgian derogation once a "reasoned consensus" was reached in COREPER-contrary to what standard bargaining theory and instrumental cost-benefit predictions would have expected. But it does not necessarily follow that a switch from a logic of consequences is complete: just ask the British if they could find someone else's argument on fiscal federalism convincing, or the French if policy toward the Middle East is open to EU deliberation and collective legitimation norms. In other words, it would be inaccurate to characterize the internalization of group-community standards as "taken-for-granted" in a holistic sense, but the bargaining behavior and decisional outcomes documented in this article do consistently confirm instances of pro-norm behavior as the "right thing to do." Second, it is possible to imagine scenarios in which the scope conditions for this socialization story were fundamentally altered: either the density of issue coverage (for example, due to the increased fragmentation of preparatory authority 122. For a conceptualization of how "the European dimension is included in national selfconceptions," see Waever 1995, 412 
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